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1.0 Introduction 
The concept of financial resilience has been useful in understanding how local authorities respond to 
significant adverse conditions or events affecting their financial position (Barbera et al. 2017). As a 
dynamic combination of strategic capacities, financial resilience allows us to go beyond “the figures” 
and provides insights to understand how financial decision making occurs within organisations 
(Barbera et al. 2018).  Saliterer et al. (2017) defined financial resilience as the ability of organisations 
to anticipate, absorb, and respond to financial shock arising from a dynamic combination of four 
interrelated phenomena, which include, (1) financial vulnerability, (2) shocks, (3) anticipatory, and (4) 
coping capacities. One of these strategic capacities, perceived financial vulnerability is the degree to 
which organisations are exposed to specific shocks or crisis (Saliterer et al. 2017). Perceived 
vulnerability is both informed by and informs an organisation’s strategic capacity to predict, interpret 
and respond to environmental changes that will impact upon its financial condition and ultimately its 
ongoing viability. 
Central government funding of councils in England has declined dramatically since 2010 and 
retrenchment has been widely used as a resilience measure (Hofer 1980, Robbins and Peart 1992, 
Pearce and Robbins 1993, Boyne 2004, Walshe et al. 2004, Beeri 2009). According to Jones (2014), 
retrenchment is primarily focussed on cost savings and efficiencies through downsizing and 
restructuring and is often a characteristic of operational turnaround.  Retrenchment is often used to 
create the financial and operational capacity for a longer-term market focus or a strategic turnaround. 
Thus, local authorities often implement short-term structural changes in response to fiscal pressures 
while they employ other long-term organisational changes to help alleviate the impact of long-term 
demand changes and service pressures. This approach was considered in a public sector context by 
Boyne (2004) and Beri (2009). UK Spending Reviews since 2010 have reduced financial support from 
central government to local authorities in the UK while the 2015 and 2017 Spending Reviews indicate 
that local authorities should expect a further significant reduction of more than 50%, in Revenue 
Service Grants (RSG) from £11.5bn to £5.4bn by 2025 (Harvey, 2016). Even though a very small number 
of local authorities may receive marginal percentage increases in their funding, the majority are 
perceived to be vulnerable to challenges as a result of continuing financial and service demand 
pressures. 
Under the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) regime, local councils had an annual ‘Use 
of Resources’ assessment (Audit Commission 2009a), which in addition to assessing their resources 
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(both financial and non-financial) was used as a tool to enhance financial management, improve 
service delivery and promote value for money. However, the performance of Northamptonshire 
County Council (NCC) was persistently weak under CPA and was one of 10 councils with lower 
performance scores for its Use of Resources in 2007 than in 2008 since its financial reporting was not 
meeting the minimum requirements (Audit Commission 2008). The Use of Resources assessment was 
abandoned by the incoming coalition government in 2010as and when it abandoned CAA. In 2014, the 
Local Audit and Accountability Act reduced the reporting requirements on local authorities, 
outsourced the remaining 70% of external audit and abolished the Audit Commission. Contrary to its 
stated objectives the perverse effect was to reduce both accountability and transparency in Local 
Authorities, an implication that became quickly obvious (Ellwood 2014, Ferry and Eckersley 2015; 
Ferry et al. 2015)    
This loosening of external control and loss of advice and support between 2010 and 2018 contributed 
to the high-profile difficulties experienced by Northamptonshire County Council in 2018, and 
widespread media reports of financial difficulties in other local authorities since then. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the perceived vulnerability of Northamptonshire County 
council (NCC) prior to the issue of two ‘section 114’ notices, in February and July, 2018 using a lens of 
financial resilience. The paper contributes to the limited literature on financial resilience and is the 
first academic paper (to the authors knowledge) that investigates the NCC’s section 114 notices; 
making NCC the first council to do so in the last two decades.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the background and 
context to the financial failure in Northamptonshire and the following section reviews the literature 
on perceived vulnerability. The fourth section describes the methodology, justifying the methods 
used. The fifth and final section discusses some initial findings and emerging conclusions. It is worth 
noting at this stage that NCC the powers available to central government to intervene that are based 
on failure to comply with part 1 of the 1999 Local Government Act were available throughout this 
period.   
 
2.0 Background, Context & Antecedents 
Northamptonshire County council’s performance, including its financial performance was measured 
through the CPA and the Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) performance management regimes 
between 2002 and 2009/10. Both regimes included an annual ‘Use of Resources’ assessment as well 
as an annual external audit ‘letter’. In 2010, the incoming coalition government replaced the CPA/CAA 
regime with a sector-led improvement regime (Audit Commission 2009b) and revised the audit 
arrangements as a result of the 2014 Act. Collectively these new financial reporting requirements and 
the Sector-Led Improvement arrangements (SLIs) were responsible for measuring and monitoring the 
council’s performance from 2010 till 2018.  
During the pre-recession period (2002 to 2010), there was a continuous increase in funding from the 
central government to NCC, in contrast to persistent cuts in central funding through fiscal austerity 
measures during the post-recession era (2010 to 2018).  
The first part of this section is based primarily upon the publically available  Audit Commission ‘use of 
resources’ reports and the annual external auditors  letters to the council, the second part, of 
necessity, is based on the annual auditors  letters, the quarterly performance reports from 2010-2019 
deposited on the LGA website and the Financial Peer Challenge organised by the LGA in 2017. 
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2.1 Pre-recession Era (2002 to 2010) 
From the first assessment of CPA in 2002, NCC provided ‘weak1’ services and signs of improvements 
were slow leading to low satisfaction by the general public (Audit Commission 2002). This weak 
performance was partially attributed to poor financial and managerial approaches, as there was 
already evidence of disorganized service plans in the council. NCC planned to improve its performance 
by developing a 3-year development plan to improve services and enhance value for money to its local 
people. In 2003, a slight improvement in services was evident among the majority of its performance 
indicators, even though Transport services remained very weak (Audit Commission 2003). NCC had an 
improved ‘financial control and management’ score which suggested a better financial positioning. 
However, systems and structures were still weak and the inspectors believed this needed a crucial 
revamp to achieve improved service delivery. NCC had the 14th lowest score (29 on their service 
delivery and 25 on their ability to improve) out of the 150 Single Tier and County Councils (STCCs) 
evaluated by the first CPA. As part of this score NCC managed to secure a score of 2 out of 4 for its 
overall financial performance.   
A ‘weak’ NCC improved to ‘fair’ in 2004 due to significant improvements in the use of resources and 
children’s services (Audit Commission 2004). However, there were some weak areas within children 
services such as the child protection register and helping older people to live at home, and NCC was 
still struggling to improve its priority services in 2005 (Audit Commission 2005). Value for money 
improved in some areas but not all these improvements were planned. Improvement plans were not 
always transforming to desirable outcomes even though these plans were reasonable and evident in 
2005. Hence performance had improved but did not fully manifest itself in achieving value for money. 
As a result, NCC’s overall rate of improvement was below the average for similar councils in 2006 
(Audit Commission 2006). The council engaged in capital investment and yet, value for money was not 
achieved but was believed or anticipated to enhance financial management and also promote service 
delivery in the future. Although performance management improved in 2006, there was evidence of 
inadequate resources to deliver their plans. By the end of 2006, it became crucial for NCC to secure a 
better overall rate of improvement. 
In 2007, NCC had a mixed overall rate of improvement. Improvement was evident in some priority 
areas such as crime reduction, improved road safety, and better environmental sanitation (Audit 
Commission 2007). However, the overall rate of improvement was below average for similar councils 
(primarily, relatively small county councils) and budget pressures led to inconsistent service delivery 
in meeting local priorities. Poor programme management, precipitated by poor performance 
management led to a further review of NCC’s Integrated Change Programme (ICP). By 2008, the 
Council had improved, although not yet across all priority areas. NCC had made progress in adopting 
the improvement plans to sustain efficiency in service delivery, although some plans needed further 
refining to be successful (Audit Commission, 2008). NCC, like other councils faced emerging financial 
and service demand pressures during and after the financial crisis between 2008 and 2009. Effective 
governance structures and leadership processes had put the council in a better position to work with 
partners to enhance value for money, yet was not enough to secure an improved CPA score which still 
rated them 2 out of 4 for Use of Resources. 
It is worth noting that not only were local government RSG settlements increasing financial support 
to the county council during this period, but NCC were receiving significant support from central 
government, the LGA (through the Improvement and Development Agency) and surrounding local 
authorities for its services and activities. For example, DCLG established the West Northamptonshire 
                                                            
1 CPA classified the performance of councils as Poor, Weak, Fair, Good, and Excellent 
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Joint Planning Unit and the North Northamptonshire Planning Units to assist with planning and 
development. The Police and Crime Standards Directorate of the Home Office sent its first Partnership 
Support Programme taskforce to assist Northamptonshire and its districts ‘drive up the performance’ 
of the Community Safety Partnership and the first multiple authority peer evaluation of Sport and 
Leisure provision was undertaken with the county and districts in 2004/5.    
In 2010, as part of the new CAA regime NCC’s external auditors (KPMG) issued “an unqualified” audit 
verdict for the first time in years, although the auditors raised issues regarding poor financial reporting 
and performance management (KPMG 2010). The auditor referred to NCC’s financial reporting 
processes as “unrecognisable compared to 2007/08” but still included 17 significant adjustments 
(valued at £107m) to balance the books (KPMG 2010). 
2.2. Post-recession Era (2010 to 2016/17) 
As a result of the Comprehensive Spending review in 2010, it became clearer that the central 
government would significantly reduce revenue support grants to local authorities, including 
Northamptonshire County Council. This affected the council’s plans for spending on core, and other 
priorities areas of services. In 2011 the external auditors also pointed out that the council failed to 
address issues outlined in previous audits (KPMG 2011). NCC was slow at implementing previous 
recommendations although the council was closely monitored by external auditors, and was 
depositing quarterly performance reports with the LGA. Between 2011 and 2012, the external auditors 
raised one ‘high’, and eleven ‘medium’ priority recommendations (KPMG 2012), which added to the 
unresolved recommendations made in previous years. According to the auditors, NCC lacked expertise 
in financial reporting and management, which affected the quality of specific accounting areas 
including the fixed asset register, and grants. In 2014, NCC confirmed an £8.5m unadjusted audit error, 
which remained as an unadjusted audit difference because the council failed to correct it (KPMG 
2014). 
NCC faced challenges in meeting service demands due to a budget deficit of £415m in 2015/16 (KPMG 
2016). There were overspends of £20.9m on children, families and education services, whilst adult 
care was overspent by £8.5m, although there were underspends of £30.4m on corporate services due 
to the excessive use of earmarked reserves in 2016 (KPMG 2016). It became evident that NCC did not 
have enough reserves to make a similar level of transfer in 2016/17 should the savings fall below 
planned levels (KPMG 2017). In addition, NCC incurred higher audit fees due to delays in obtaining 
working papers and producing bank reconciliation statements, and late adjustments made to the 
accounts. In 2017 NCC with a new management team in place agreed to an LGA Financial Peer Review. 
This found that “major shortfalls in achievement have been the norm in the last few years and reserves 
and balances have been used to ensure that the Council’s annual budget and accounts show a viable 
position” (LGA 2017. P.1). The formal response from the council and the proposed action plan 
published in November 2017 was followed in January 2018 by the Secretary of State appointing an 
independent inspection of the  authority’s corporate governance and financial management systems. 
This was carried out between January and March 2018 (Caller 2018). This found that NCC had failed 
in its duty to secure best value as a result of poor management, a lack of budgetary control and a 
culture which discouraged political and managerial challenge. 
2.2.1 The Section 114 Notices 
NCC therefore were forced to issue two notices under Section 114 of the 1988 Local Government 
Finance Act in 2018 (NCC 2018). They were the first council to do so for nearly twenty years. A Section 
114 notice is a legal requirement to report, in the public interest, where a local authority fails to set 
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(or is likely to fail to set) a balanced budget. Northamptonshire had depleted its reserves and in 
February 2018, as part of the budget setting process the Chief Finance Officer was advising that the 
council would not have the resources to meet expenditure commitments in the next two financial 
years. This situation must be reported to the Full Council before 21 days and in the interim no 
significant new spending commitments could be entered into. Following the Caller report in March 
(2018) the government announced the council would be abolished and commissioners appointed to 
run the council until new arrangements were established (MHCLG 2018). Nevertheless, in July 2018, 
in consultation with the Commissioners, Northamptonshire issued a second 114 notice after receiving 
a letter from the Chief Finance Officer which identified a budget shortfall of £70m and advised that 
the spending limit could remain in place for the foreseeable future. The Chief Finance Officer also 
tendered his resignation in July 2018, and stated that the council had “no financial resilience”.  
NCC’s case presents an opportunity for research related to financial resilience and perceived financial 
vulnerability. The Section 114 notices were clearly not the first sign that there were financial 
management problems with the Council, and it has been possible to investigate the public record for 
signs of misperception of the council’s financial vulnerability.  
In view of this background, this paper will utilise the lens of financial resilience to examine how 
Northamptonshire County Council perceived its financial vulnerability during the years leading up to 
February 2018.  
 
3.0 Literature Review 
3.1 How vulnerability is perceived by Private and Public organizations 
The financial crisis has caused socio-economic problems across countries worldwide, even though 
Ladner (2017) posited that nations with stabilized economies and resilient public finances stood a 
better chance to buffer consequences from the crisis. The growing rise in the level of uncertainty and 
complexity after the crisis has increased perceived vulnerability on governance and laid more 
emphasis on how governments respond to shock and crises (Barbera et al. 2019). Some studies 
(Posner and Sommerfield 2012) agreed that the global financial crisis was an event that compelled 
governments of developed countries to adopt various measures to ensure economic stability. In 
effect, they either had significant reductions in public expenditure or raised tax levels. On the contrary, 
Blyth (2013) argued that austerity was a failed idea that has complicated the impacts of the crisis and 
resulted in increased financial vulnerability among individuals, organisations, and governments. It is 
worth noting that countries may encounter different levels of perceived vulnerability due to various 
stages of an unforeseen event like the crisis. 
The approach adopted in the UK was heavily redolent of the approach to the sovereign debt crises in 
Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and later, Spain where the European Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, and the European Union (commonly known as the Troika) insisted on austerity measures and 
multiple rounds of tax increases, spending cuts, and reforms. from 2010 to 2016. According to Posner 
and Sommerfield (2012), austerity has become a common response measure for developed countries, 
compelling them to make difficult decisions that tend to increase perceived vulnerability among 
individuals and organisations. Hence, some governments have implemented austerity measures to 
minimise public debt levels through reduced public expenditure. Kenneth et al. (2015) agreed to this 
notion but also suggested that economic restructuring was a resilience measure that could cause a 
downturn and increased perceived vulnerability. On this note, countries including the United States 
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(Korac et al. 2017), Italy (Barbera 2017), the Netherlands (Overmans 2017), and England (Jones 2017) 
have suffered severe impacts during and after every crisis. The magnitude of severity suffered appears 
to be related to the level of perceived vulnerability encountered within these countries. Among them, 
countries like England (Jones 2017), and Netherlands (Overmans 2017) have adopted measures 
including coping and anticipatory capacities to weather the shocks absorbed from the crisis and this 
reduced perceived vulnerability (Barbera et al. 2019). In these cases, their local governments deployed 
their capacities and capabilities to forecast possible events and manage their vulnerabilities in coping 
with such shocks during times of crises.  
According to Lodge and Hood (2012), low vulnerability level countries (Australia, Denmark, South 
Korea) witnessed a marginal fall in reserves from 54% to 25% over 6 years after the crisis whilst the 
high vulnerability level countries experienced (Greece, Hungary, and Italy) an increase from 11% to 
29% during the same period. From the Table below, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (2011) analysed vulnerability among countries before and after the crisis (between 2006 
and 2012) to track the changes in the level of perceived vulnerability among countries worldwide. 
Perceived vulnerability of the United Kingdom and Ireland moved from low vulnerability to high 
vulnerability as a result of the shocks from the global financial crisis. However, in countries like 
Norway, there was less or no major change in the level of perceived vulnerability. The financial crisis 
affected most countries but the impact on level of perceived vulnerability varied from country to 
country. For example, China had a slower economic recovery response to shocks due its large 
population of individuals at the poor and low-income level (Jalan and Ravallion 1998).  
Table 1.2: Varying Degree of Perceived Financial Vulnerability among OECD States. 
Degree of Perceived 
Financial Vulnerability OECD States (2006) OECD States (2012) 
High (5/6) Greece, Italy Greece France, Ireland, Japan, 
Poland, Portugal, United 
Kingdom, USA 
Medium (3/4) Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Japan, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, USA 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Slovakia, Spain 
Low (2) Australia, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Ireland, South 
Korea, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom 
Australia, Czech Republic, South 
Korea, Luxembourg, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland,  
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 89, June 2011.  
OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
From the table above, the countries rated with high levels of vulnerability may have been exposed to 
different levels of shocks from the crisis. According to the OECD (2011), Greece, Japan, the United 
States of America, and the United Kingdom have a private sector which were considered to be as large 
as the public sector in financial terms. Hence, Lodge and Hood (2012) found that a failure in the 
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banking sector of these countries; were a major factor that exposed their economies and respective 
local governments to financial crisis.  
Governments provide public services to ensure a high living standard among the citizens. Public 
services play a significant role in the lives of individual households, especially low-income households 
(Hastings et al. 2013). The most important responsibility of a government is to ensure security, safety, 
and protection of individuals in their society. But there are issues that challenge governments when 
structuring measures to ensure the safety, protection, and security of the citizens. The financial crisis 
has affected the perceived vulnerability levels of governments, and thus, affected individual 
households to a large extent. Hastings et al. (2013) found that governments have made less cuts on 
social services that are mostly used by the individuals in the poorer groups and made extensive cuts 
in those used by richer groups.  However, Khan (2012) suggested that countries become more 
vulnerable when individuals lack the required financial resources to absorb the pressures that 
emanate from unforeseen events like the crisis.  
 
3.2 Perceived Vulnerability in Local Authorities Internationally 
The global financial crisis has caused impacts on the performance of local government authorities 
across nations worldwide.  According to Du Boys et al. (2017), the crisis has challenged most local 
authorities to devise productive strategies to restore the financial damages that were caused during 
and after the crisis. Again, the severity of this consequence varied among national and local 
governments respectively, leading to changes in their level of perceived vulnerability. Ladner (2017) 
postulated that there seems to be a lack of consistency in the change in vulnerability levels in the local 
government sector. This skews the debate about determining the best performing local authority, as 
they may have a high level of vulnerability. To this end, cities and municipalities have faced severe 
challenges from the crisis but have devised different strategies that have increased or decreased their 
level of perceived vulnerability. For example, in the UK where the Cambridgeshire County Council was 
financially resilient robust to mobilize funds from capital investments in 2018 during the continuing 
austerity. During the same period, its neighbouring authority - Northamptonshire County Council 
issued a Section 114 notice due to financial failure. In the USA, the City of Chicago became more 
vulnerable due to changes in revenues from the state grant and aids from the state government 
(Hendrick et al. 2010). Hence, the City of Chicago faced tough times as there was limited resources 
during an era of increased service demand pressures. 
Local government authorities have distinct levels of perceived vulnerability across different countries 
worldwide, Hastings et al. 2013) asserted that local authorities have taken considerable measures to 
lower the high level of perceived vulnerability among their citizens. Barbera et al. (2017) and Steccolini 
et al. (2017) agree to this assertion, but found that local authorities have implemented coping and/or 
anticipatory response capacities to restore their financial status and ensure value for money. Barbera 
et al. (2017) found that the level of perceived vulnerability of local authorities were mostly dependent 
on the severity of shock they encounter and absorb. Steccolini et al. (2017) investigated the impact of 
shocks across local authorities in eleven countries and found three major external shocks namely; (1) 
global financial crisis, (2) migration, and (3) the change in financial regulations. Barbera et al. (2019) 
validated these findings, but characterised local authorities in the UK and Italy to be affected mostly 
by the global financial crisis. Local authorities in countries like Germany were mostly affected by 
factors like immigration (Barbera et al. 2019). On the whole, it is clear that just like central 
governments, local authorities may have been hit to a varying degree by the crisis. 
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Recent literature (Barbera et al. 2017; Steccolini et al. 2017) was found that local governments 
adopted coping and/or anticipatory capacities depending on the severity of shocks absorbed, external 
conditions that may be favourable or unfavourable at different levels of vulnerability. In Steccolini et 
al. (2017), their study investigated the major types of shocks that caused changes in levels of perceived 
vulnerability across eleven nations. Studies by Barbera et al. (2017); Drew (2017); and Papenfuß et al. 
(2017) support this claim, but emphasized that local authorities in developed countries such as Italy 
and the UK also experienced long-term shocks due to factors including tax regulations and 
devolvement of tasks. Italian local authorities are allowed to raise tax rates within a legal tax ceiling; 
German authorities operate autonomously which allows them to flexibly prioritise limited funds to 
services and promote value for money (Barbera et al. 2017). UK local authorities are constrained to 
prioritise statutory over discretionary services due to a continuous and persistent increase in service 
demand.  
Perceived vulnerability of local authorities may change due to other external factors including change 
in bank regulations, uncertain and risky economic environments, and reduction in local government 
grants (Du Boys, 2017). Change in national economic conditions including organisational culture 
and/or tradition may also affect local authorities’ levels of perceived vulnerability. These changes may 
have positive or negative impacts on perceived vulnerability. For example, the Referendum vote 
where the majority have voted for the UK to leave the European Union (EU) seem to have issues more 
difficult and challenging for individuals and institutions in the UK. Elsewhere in France, the three levels 
of local government (region, department and municipality) operate with a similar legal system, but 
municipalities seem to assume more responsibility which vary from social services to transportation 
affairs (Du Boys et al. 2017). Central government in France provided financial support (grants) to 
municipalities to enhance stability after the crisis (Du Boys 2017). These revenue grants decreased 
after 2014, and municipalities engaged in budget balancing strategies to withstand the shocks 
absorbed (Du Boys et al. 2017). Du Boys et al. (2017) postulated that French municipalities did not 
consider increasing tax rates, but complained about the grants reductions in 2015, which caused a fall 
in their capital investments.  
In Italy, the local government structure is similar to France (being multi-level), but a fourth level of 
government comprises both regional and municipal authorities. Unlike France, the financial situation 
in Italy was different since cutback strategies adopted were effective before and after the financial 
crisis (until 2012). These cutback strategies included rationalisation of personnel (staff) and other cuts 
in current expenditure. In 2012, the central government introduced reforms to aimed to ensure 
stability in the economy. This introduced a flexible regime where municipalities were encouraged to 
adopt measures to withstand the various level of vulnerability. This situation is evident in France, 
where municipalities are not hindered by financial constraints because bankruptcy procedures do not 
apply to local governments and their assets poorly (Du Boys 2017). Hence, the under-performing 
French municipalities have their debt levels extended to enable more spending (Du Boys 2017). 
Consequently, the Italian local authorities adopted coping capacities in reducing their revenues to 
counteract the austerity policies implemented by the Italian central government (Du Boys et al. 2017). 
Interestingly, Du Boys et al. (2017) also suggested that a reduction in grants from central government 
caused a decrease in spending among local authorities, and made them more vulnerable. On this note, 
austerity policies have challenged local authorities to devise feasible and effective capacities to 
withstand the shocks in the short and medium term, and to also minimise their perceived vulnerability 
levels in the long term. 
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3.2.1 Perceived Vulnerability among Local Authorities in the UK  
The local government sector in the UK has been characterised with one of the foremost adversities of 
the austerity era, especially since the 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review (Bailey et al. 2015). Local 
authorities in England have been significantly affected by loss of government support; after the 2010 
settlement reported a reduction of Revenue Support Grants (RSGs) of £5.6 billion representing a cut 
of 28% over the 4-year period of review (Hastings 2015b). Since 2012/2012, Liverpool City Council 
needed an accumulated total of £247.5 million in savings to achieve a balanced budget over 6-year 
period of austerity (Kennett et al. 2015). This means there were cutbacks in some statutory and 
discretionary services such as social services for adults and children, as well as the disabled (Kennett 
et al. 2015). Conversely, the impacts of austerity on Bristol City Council was less significant as the 
council was less reliant on revenue grants from government. This may be the case because the Bristol 
City Council adopted a more long-term, strategist, and interventionist approach, where proactive 
capacities were adopted to reduce expenditure before the crisis and implementation of austerity. On 
this note, it can be deduced that local authorities’ perceived vulnerability levels were determined by 
the magnitude of shocks absorbed from austerity policies.  
 
Local authorities in the UK function on high levels of local political autonomy but are closely monitored 
and regulated by strict central governments in England, Wales, Scotland and the Republic of Northern 
Ireland (Wilson and Game 2011) based on fiscal and policy perspectives. Therefore, unlike other 
European countries, central governments in the UK have more control over their respective local 
government authorities in terms of financial and fund management. Similar to Italy and France, UK 
local authorities are funded both centrally and locally. In England, over half (57%) of local authorities’ 
revenue for 2013/14 was generated from central government grants (i.e. specific and general), almost 
a quarter (22%) is collected locally (residential and business taxes), and the rest from service charges 
(13%) and capital receipts (8%) (Barbera et al. 2019). In their study, Barbera et al. (2019) found that 
UK local authorities had a lower level of perceived vulnerability than that of local authorities in Italy 
and Germany (highest level). This may be because UK local authorities are allowed to borrow, but 
within self-managed levels that are repayable.  
 
Perceived Vulnerability can be categorised in two viewpoints within an organisation. Anessi-Pessina 
et al. (2012) found evidence to suggest that managers make decisions on revenue and expenditure to 
resolve/correct internal and external contingencies. Helm (2015) agreed to the notion, but added that 
organisational systems and processes provided proactive capacities in analysing the internal and 
external viewpoints of their operations. In addition to these internal and external viewpoints, other 
capacities may be adopted to rectify obvious vulnerability level and to mitigate or reduce possible 
consequences (Helm 2015). Perceived financial vulnerability evolves from internal and external 
viewpoints (Du Boys et al. 2017). Thus, there is a possibility of failure in organisational systems and 
potential consequences from uncertain and/or unforeseen events that may thwart progress in 
organisational systems and processes. For this reason, there is a crucial need to perceive vulnerability 
levels of organisations from internal and external viewpoints. In other studies, these viewpoints 
referred to such characteristics as “factors” (Du Boys et al. 2017) or “sources” (Steccolini et al. 2017). 
For the purpose of this study, these will be referred to as “viewpoints”. 
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Local government authorities tend to adopt financial resilience strategies to sustain and recover from 
consequences of crisis, as Klase (2011) suggested that the authorities’ reaction to fiscal stress is 
determined by the severity of fiscal retrenchment.  With regards to local authorities, Steccolini et al. 
(2017) found that financial vulnerability was perceived as a result of internal (i.e. reserves, debt 
financing) and external (dependency on government funds, undiversified revenues) factors. This 
emphasizes the need to understand the effects of adopting internal and external capacities for 
financial decision making by local authorities to cope and adapt in times of crisis. Again, as Du Boys 
(2017) proved that local authorities with greater levels of coping and anticipatory capacities are able 
to limit the degree of cutback management or tax increments. In other words, these four dimensions 
are intertwined and linked to each other. Hence, local authorities manage to make (employ) decisions 
(strategies) that comprise these dimensions to cope and adapt with crisis. It becomes crucial to 
determine the internal and external viewpoints of perceived vulnerabilities of local authorities during 
times of austerity. BBC (2019) forecasted that 11 out of 152 councils in England will have full exhausted 
their cash reserves within the next four budgetary years. Northamptonshire County Council (91% drop 
in reserves) ranked first among 11 of the 152 councils which have used much of their reserves since 
2015. Continuing austerity localism and cutback management means English councils are currently 
depleting reserves to balance funding gaps or engage further service cutbacks. From the figure (1.2) 
below, other councils set to fall with high perceived vulnerability include Somerset (-73%), Rotherham 
(-62%), Thurrock (-58%) will either have to reduce services and/or deplete their limited reserves. 
Figure 1.2: Percentage Loss in Reserve for English Local Authorities 
 
 
Source: MHCLG (2019) 
 
Northamptonshire County Council further depleted its reserves after their financial failure was 
revealed by the two Section 114 notices in February and July, 2018). The county council was also 
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directed together with its district councils to create two unitary authorities, whilst an improvement 
and stabilisation plan was created to generate £20m back into the council’s reserves during 2018/19.  
 
4.0 Methodology and Methods 
Adopting a case study approach using qualitative data analysis, this research investigated the publicly 
available archival data, including financial data held by the UK government, external audit and 
inspection reports, the Council’s published accounts, peer assessments and other council reports to 
evaluate the antecedents to the Section 114 notices.  
External audits and CPA/CAA reports may sometimes be regarded as secondary data rather than 
primary data, despite being verified and approved by professional bodies (external auditors). 
However, this study has l used this ‘secondary’ data as it was collected for the same purpose that it is 
being used for this study; which is to measure, monitor, and manage the services of the county council.  
Miles and Huberman (1994) consider data analysis qualitative research to consist of three concurrent 
flows of activity data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing/verification. Data reduction is 
the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying abstracting and transforming data which they see as 
continuing throughout the life of qualitative projects. Even before data is collected “anticipatory data 
reduction is occurring as the researcher decides which cases which research questions and which data 
collection approaches to choose” (Miles and Huberman 1994 p10). The three types of analysis 
(reduction, display and conclusion drawing/verification) form an interactive cyclical process and 
qualitative data analysis is a continuous iterative enterprise.   
 
5.0 Emerging Findings 
• It is now apparent that the issuing of the 114 notices were the results of longer term 
accumulated weaknesses, and not the results of short-term abnormal or one-off adverse 
events. 
o Government had powers of intervention since CPA time which would have been used 
then in both periods, but they did not intervene formerly in Northamptonshire County 
Council till the issuance of the two Section 114 notices. 
 
• The period from 2002 to 2010, was characterised by increased investment by central 
government in local government support. The performance of NCC, in managing its services and 
its financial and fiduciary duties varied to an extent but was generally weak, and this was despite 
significant external assistance from the central government, local government, local authority 
peers, and related agencies. In fact, Central Government and key stakeholders were continually 
active and generally sought to support NCC to meet its objectives and obligations.  There were 
however clear early warning signs that a policy of continual retrenchment may not be adequate 
in the long run and that a more strategic approach was required.   
 
• The evidence for the period after 2010 is not as ‘rich’ or detailed as the evidence before 2010, 
but annual accounts and external audit letters strongly suggested a weak and weakening 
financial positioning throughout. Thus, the council encountered ever-deepening pressures on 
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its financial accounts which was caused by financial mismanagement allied to the continuous 
increases in service demand pressure.  
 
• Since 2010, service demand pressure has increased, but the central government support has 
continually decreased. In their response, to the LGA Financial Peer Review NCC agreed that 
council taxes increases were lower over many years, (as a result of NCC’s own decisions) and 
claimed services were relatively underfunded compared to other similar councils. This is 
indicative of what previous studies have described as a state of ‘denial’. 
 
• The result was that in fiscal terms, the potential of retrenchment had virtually become 
exhausted – as the council engaged in a continuous use of retrenchment to solve long-term 
problems, which led to lower levels of reserves. The final result was for them to raid reserves, 
but this was a short them response to long-term structural problems. Clearly, NCC needed a 
long-term strategic turnaround; clearly, NCC was unable to achieve this turnaround. The LGA 
and government have been reluctant to intervene under SLI until Section 114 notices were 
issued and it resulted into a strategic approach that remains unclear. 
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